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This paper  investigates  how  newly  hired  workers  learn  on the job  and  the  extent  to which
this  learning  is affected  by  their  co-workers’  tenure.  We  estimate  tenure-performance
proﬁles  using  weekly  panel  data  on  individual  workers’  performance.  The  results  show  a
performance  increase  of  64% in  the  ﬁrst  year  of  the  employment.  We  show  that,  during  the
ﬁrst  three  months,  workers  placed  in teams  with  more  experienced  peers  have  signiﬁcantly
steeper  tenure-performance  proﬁles  than  those  employed  in  teams  with less  experienced
peers. Our results  suggest  that placing  new  workers  in  more  experienced  teams  reduces
the  time  new  hires  need  to  become  equally  productive  as  an experienced  worker  by  36%,
compared  to  being  placed  in  less  experienced  teams.
©  2016  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
. Introduction
Next to investments in formal training, job tenure is shown to be an important determinant of workers’ productivity.
revious studies on tenure-performance proﬁles show that workers experience substantial gains from learning on the job
Bishop, 1989; Kostiuk and Follmann, 1989; Shaw and Lazear, 2008). Data from the international Program for the Interna-
ional Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) survey show the relevance and high frequency of on-the-job learning at
he workplace (OECD, 2013). The percentage of workers who state that they are involved in learning by doing every week
anges from 28% (South Korea) to 67% (Spain), with 66% for workers in the US. Workers, however, might learn not only from
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om  Hedelius och Tore Browalds stiftelse (Grant number I2011-0345:1). The authors thank Eric Bonsang, Ben Kriechel, Olivier Marie, Anders Stenberg,
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ssociation of Labour Economics, and the European Economic Association for helpful comments. This paper has been screened to ensure no conﬁdential
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practicing their tasks, but also from observing or imitating their peers at work and from peer feedback (Barron et al., 1989).
PIACC data suggest that this is not negligible: for the US, 51% of all workers state that they are involved in learning from
co-workers or supervisors on a daily basis. When there are opportunities to learn from peers, a worker’s output may  thus not
only increase with tenure, but also through being exposed to more experienced peers. Although there are various studies
of peer effects on worker performance (e.g., Mas  and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010), to the best of our knowledge, no
studies have analyzed the impact of more experienced peers on the performance of newly hired workers.
We ﬁll this gap in the literature by analyzing tenure-performance proﬁles using unique data of a large call center that
is part of a multinational telephone company in the Netherlands. These personnel data contain detailed information on the
performance of individual call agents over time. Over a period of 127 weeks, we observe the individual performance of 284
newly hired agents all performing the same tasks, irrespective of tenure, using the same technology, and facing the same
incentives set by the call center’s management. This setting provides substantial variation in both tenure and weekly team
composition, which allows us to estimate tenure-performance proﬁles as well as peer effects in learning. The data we  use
allow for very detailed analyses of tenure-performance proﬁles. Similar to other studies using comparable data on call center
agents (e.g., Castilla, 2005; Liu and Batt, 2007; De Grip and Sauermann, 2012), we use an objective measure of performance
that is based on the average call handling time.
We  ﬁnd a large marginal return to tenure in the ﬁrst months of working for the call center that decreases substantially
after gaining experience on the job. This tenure-performance proﬁle closely follows a logarithmic speciﬁcation. For the ﬁrst
year on the job, a 10% increase in tenure is related to an increase of 4% of one standard deviation in performance. This steep
learning curve translates into a performance increase of 64% within the ﬁrst year of the employment. We show that this
effect is not driven by selection of workers out of the ﬁrm. Using additional information on customer satisfaction, we  ﬁnd
some evidence of a quality–quantity trade-off in the tenure-performance proﬁle. The results suggest, however, that the
increase in quantitative performance outweighs the decrease in quality.
As our measure of performance, average handling time, measures how fast workers perform, the data allow us to precisely
calculate the ﬁrm’s investments in new hires. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrm invests, on average, 124 working hours in on-the-job
learning of each newly hired worker during the ﬁrst year. This investment in on-the-job learning is close to the ﬁrm’s
investment in formal training courses during a new hire’s ﬁrst year.
Our results are in line with the results of studies in other sectors of industry that show steep learning in the ﬁrst period of a
new job, after which the rates of learning converge to a level at which further improvements are hardly possible. For example,
Carroll et al. (1986) and Kostiuk and Follmann (1989) ﬁnd that military recruiters show strong performance improvements in
the ﬁrst weeks followed by stable performance. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) report similar tenure-performance proﬁles for
several tasks in different industries. More recently, Shaw and Lazear (2008) observed that workers who install car windshields
perform 53% better after eight months of working on the job and even perform 82% better after one year.1 In this study, we
provide corroborative evidence for these non-linear learning patterns, provide evidence for several different performance
measures, and go beyond previous studies by putting the ﬁrm’s investments in on-the-job learning in perspective to the
ﬁrm’s investments in formal training courses.
This study also contributes to the literature on peer effects in the workplace. Several studies using information from
personnel records ﬁnd positive externalities either through social ties or through spatial proximity (Bandiera et al., 2010;
Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas  and Moretti, 2009; De Grip and Sauermann, 2012).2 In contrast to these studies, Guryan et al.
(2009) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant peer effects on worker performance, suggesting that peer effects might be related to speciﬁc
industries, occupational groups, or tasks. With respect to peer effects in learning, Barron et al. (1989) provide evidence that
workers report to spend a substantial part of learning investments watching other workers performing their tasks, whereas
Destré et al. (2008) show that workers can learn about 10% of their own  stock of human capital from their co-workers. In
addition, Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) ﬁnd peer effects among teachers. Students beneﬁt the most if their teacher has
more effective colleagues, and this effect is strongest for less experienced teachers. In a study using data from the same call
centre, De Grip and Sauermann (2012) analyze the returns to a week-long training program and ﬁnd that there is a causal
effect from treated workers on their untreated peers. This paper contributes to these studies by providing evidence for peer
effects on new hires’ learning in the ﬁrst months of the employer–employee relationship.
To estimate peer effects in learning, we exploit the fact that agents are placed in teams of varying peer composition. In
the ﬁrm analyzed in this study, agents who belong to the same team are located next to each other on the work ﬂoor. The
assignment of newly hired agents to different teams and the assignment of team members to different working shifts and
weeks can be regarded as near-random variation in peer assignment. We  exploit this variation to identify peer effects on
workers’ individual learning processes. We  ﬁnd that there are indeed peer effects when agents work with more experienced
peers in their team. While agents in less experienced teams need 160 h of investments in on-the-job learning to become
proﬁcient, those who are placed in more experienced teams need only 102 h. This suggests that placing new agents in
experienced teams reduces the investments in on-the-job learning by 36% during the ﬁrst year of employment.
1 More broadly, our results also contribute to studies analyzing learning by doing at the establishment level, indicating the learning by doing of individual
workers as well as technological or managerial improvements. Examples are aircraft production (Benkard, 2000), wartime ship building (Thompson, 2001),
automobile production (Levitt et al., 2013), and cancer surgery (Avdic et al., 2014).
2 Herbst and Mas  (2015) provide an excellent overview of laboratory and ﬁeld studies on peer effects in the workplace.
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the setting of this study and present arguments for both
earning by doing and learning from others. In Section 3, we  discuss our empirical model and present the estimates of the
enure-performance proﬁle of call agents and the effects of peers on workers’ tenure-performance proﬁles. We then provide
ore evidence on the identiﬁcation of our results and present additional results using alternative performance measures in
ection 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the study.
. Data
.1. Information on the workplace
To estimate tenure-performance proﬁles and the impact of peers on the shape of these proﬁles, we use panel data of call
gents in a call center with weekly performance information. The call center belongs to a multinational telecommunications
ompany in the Netherlands and acts as a service center for the ﬁrm’s current and prospective customers (cf. De Grip and
auermann, 2012). To ensure a homogeneous production process, we  focus our analysis on the largest department in the
all center, which handles the inbound calls of private customers with ﬁxed cell phone contracts. All agents working in this
epartment have the same task of handling customer calls in case of questions, complaints, or problems. Other interactions
ith customers, such as written correspondence, are dealt with by other back-ofﬁce employees.
In case of vacancies, a temporary work agency selects applicants and employs them as temporary help agents, after
hich they are hired under ﬁxed-term contracts by the call center. Prior to their ﬁrst working week, new agents receive
n initial training of about three weeks. The department consists of 16 teams, with an average team size of 15 agents. Each
f the teams is led by a team leader who is responsible for monitoring and coaching the agents on the team. In general, all
eams provide all services; that is, there is no specialization of teams in handling certain types of calls or serving certain
ypes of customers. Team leaders are not involved in the selection of agents to their team. Instead, the department’s general
anagement assigns newly hired and trained agents to teams with vacancies.
Although agents’ performance is continuously measured, they are paid a ﬂat pay with a yearly adjustment. After a formal
valuation by the team leader following an annual appraisal interview, agents can receive a wage increase of up to 8%, as
ell as an annual bonus, both of which depend on the grade obtained in the appraisal interview. The grade is supposed to
eﬂect the agents’ performance as well as their behavior toward co-workers and management.
.2. Measuring performance
The data contain objective performance information for each call agent for each week the agent works. The performance
easure yi,t is based on the average handling time ahti,t of agent i in calendar week t. It measures the average time an
gent spent talking to a customer and logging the information about the call in the customer database. This measure has the
dvantage of being an automatically generated key performance indicator of the call center and is not affected by supervisors’
otentially subjective performance evaluations (Flabbi and Ichino, 2001). Furthermore, this measure is preferable to wage
ata because it directly measures performance, while agents’ wages are ﬁxed under hourly pay (Shaw and Lazear, 2008).
In recent studies using data on call agents, similar outcomes are used to measure an agent’s productivity (e.g., Castilla,
005; Liu and Batt, 2007; De Grip and Sauermann, 2012). Average handling time is used by management as the key per-
ormance indicator for monitoring the call center’s performance to reduce costs by decreasing the average agent’s handling
ime without decreasing quality and is measured in seconds. We therefore deﬁne productivity as yi,t = (100/ahti,t). A decrease
n the average handling time ahti,t is thus interpreted as an increase in performance yi,t.3
.3. Potential for peer effects
Irrespective of tenure, all agents have the same task, that is, answering customer calls. If new hires are exposed to peers
ith higher tenure in the early days of their employment in the ﬁrm, they may  learn from their peers in different ways,
uch as effectively retrieving information from customers or how to use the computer software system in speciﬁc cases. This
llows them to deal with customers’ requests more efﬁciently.
We argue that these peer effects are strongest within teams. First, workplaces in the call center are organized into work
slands, with up to eight agents of a team sitting next to each other. This spatial proximity implies that there is potential
or peer effects through learning from peers by exchanging information and giving feedback. As there are no dividing walls
etween individual work places, agents can, for example, learn through observing their peers, through asking their peers
uring calls, or through getting feedback either between calls or during breaks. Second, agents of a team participate in
egular team meetings. A total of 80% of the agents stated that they exchange work-related information mostly during
fﬁcial team meetings or at their workplace (De Grip and Sauermann, 2012). More experienced workers are also encouraged
o help their co-workers as the grade they get in their annual appraisal interview also depends on their “behavior towards
3 We deal with potential quality–quantity trade-offs in Section 4.2.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All  agents New hires Stayer Leaver Diff (3)–(4)
Performance (yi,t) 0.3465 0.3032 0.3179 0.2892 0.0287***
(0.1581) (0.1037) (0.1035) (0.1021) (11.0674)
Call  quality (yq
i,t
)§ 0.4998 0.5270 0.5202 0.5337 −0.0135*
(0.1930) (0.2032) (0.1959) (0.2101) (−2.2648)
Composite measure (y′ i,t)§ 0.2667 0.2382 0.2465 0.2299 0.0166***
(0.0819) (0.0728) (0.0689) (0.0756) (7.7792)
Grade  1§ 6.8176 6.9222 7.1152 6.6407 0.4745*
(1.8739) (1.9244) (1.7746) (2.0989) (2.2764)
Grade  2§ 6.3362 6.4277 6.6068 6.1604 0.4464*
(1.9960) (2.0795) (2.0291) (2.1318) (1.9738)
Grade  3§ 5.8859 6.0102 6.1440 5.8237 0.3202
(2.3542) (2.3803) (2.2583) (2.5372) (1.2025)
Tenure (in years) 2.7514 0.3296 0.4035 0.2590 0.1445***
(3.5988) (0.2535) (0.2794) (0.2023) (23.5785)
Working hours 20.5103 23.7400 25.3378 22.2122 3.1256***
(9.9938) (10.2536) (11.0127) (9.2173) (12.23)
Training hours (per week)§ 0.8749 1.0342 1.0076 1.0595 −0.0519
(4.8540) (5.1884) (5.1193) (5.2542) (−0.3965)
Gender (1 = male) 0.2938 0.3352 0.3442 0.3266 0.0176
(0.4555) (0.4721) (0.4752) (0.4690) (1.4759)
Age§ 32.5582 26.2018 26.9163 25.4655 1.4508***
(11.1813) (7.9377) (9.0759) (6.4808) (7.0521)
Educational level§ 2.0669 1.9897 1.8899 2.2890 −0.3991***
(0.7981) (0.7226) (0.7266) (0.6211) (−11.6259)
Observations 14,832 6295 3077 3218 6295
Number of agents 407 284 98 186 284Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The sample of new hires (estimation sample) is deﬁned as all agents with a maximum tenure of one year who can be
observed from their ﬁrst working week (new hires). Variables marked with a “§” are available for subsamples only. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
co-workers”. They also do not have an incentive not to help new hires as there are no bonuses allocated on the basis of
measured productivity. Moreover, since there is no hierarchy within the team, there is no competition between workers for
particular (senior) positions.
This indicates that there is potential for peer effects in this production process and that these effects are likely to be larger
within teams than between teams. In this study, we  exploit the assignment of individual agents to teams. This generates
near-random variation in the teammates an agent works with and thus in exposure to peer tenure.
2.4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We  observe all agents working for this department and their performance for each week from October 2007 through
March 2010. In the course of the observation period, 407 agents worked for this department. We focus our analysis on the
sample of new hires in their ﬁrst year. We  deﬁne new hires as agents we  can observe from their ﬁrst working week. This
avoids left-censoring the data and lowers the risk of biased results due to selection out of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, learning is
likely to be concentrated in the beginning of the employment relations and more affected by tenure in this period compared
to later periods (cf. Shaw and Lazear, 2008).
The estimation sample of the newly hired comprises 284 agents, for a total of 6295 observations. Table 1 shows the
descriptive statistics for all agents (Column (1)) and the agents in the estimation sample (Column (2)). Because of the focus
on those newly hired, agents in the estimation sample have substantially lower tenure (2.8 years in the full sample versus
0.3 years in the estimation sample). This translates into large differences in performance yi,t. Agents in the full sample have
an average performance of 0.35, while agents in the estimation sample have an average performance of 0.3. The average
number of working hours is 21 h per week for the average agent, while agents in the estimation sample work 24 h per week.
A total of 29% (34%) of the agents in the full (estimation) sample are men  and their average age is 33 (26) years. These ﬁgures
are comparable to those of call centers in general, which are characterized by a predominantly female workforce with a
substantial proportion of part-time workers (Batt et al., 2009).
3. Estimating tenure-performance proﬁles3.1. Theoretical framework
Our theoretical framework follows the model of Rosen (1972), in which individuals enter jobs with an initial stock of
human capital (h0), for example, from schooling or previous jobs. Workers can gain additional human capital by investing in
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n-the-job learning. On-the-job learning comes at opportunity costs, but positively affects the worker’s job-speciﬁc human
apital in subsequent periods t, ht. In Rosen (1972), workers’ investments decline with tenure, since there is less time available
o capitalize the returns from later investments. The growth rate of human capital from period t − 1 to t is denoted gt:
ht − ht−1 = gt · ht−1 (1)
he more experienced workers get, the closer they come to the maximum of on the job knowledge that they can accumulate
n this job. Rosen’s model implies that workers exhibit strong growth rates in ht in their early career that later diminish
h′ > 0 and h′′ < 0).
While the rate of learning gt is likely to be determined by past investments in self-learning, previous studies provide
vidence of peer effects in learning (Destré et al., 2008; Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009; De Grip and Sauermann, 2012).
f workers with higher tenure have higher levels of knowledge, workers who work with them should be more prone to
earn from them. For the purpose of this study, we therefore split learning into two components: learning by doing (i.e.,
elf-learning) and learning from others. The term gt · ht−1 is therefore replaced by gt · hi,t−1, which captures self-learning, or
earning by doing, and gj,(i),t · hj,(i),t−1, which captures learning from peers in a worker i’s team j:
ht − ht−1 = gi,t · hi,t−1 + gj,(i),t · hj,(i),t−1 (2)
he parameter gi,t captures self-learning, while the parameter gj,(i),t captures learning from a peer’s tenure.
.2. Estimating learning effects
We  ﬁrst present evidence on workers’ learning by doing. The solid line in Panel (a) of Fig. 1 shows the average performance
f all new hires over tenure in their ﬁrst year working for the call center. The ﬁgure shows a steep performance increase in
he early weeks of an agent’s tenure that then ﬂattens substantially. New hires perform 48% better after six months of tenure
ompared with average performance in the ﬁrst month of employment. After one year, agents perform about 64% better.
To quantify learning by doing, we ﬁrst estimate tenure-performance proﬁles using a linear-log speciﬁcation. The dashed
ine in Panel (a) of Fig. 1, which shows the predicted performance from a regression of yi,t on the logarithm of tenure di,t,
og(di,t), follows average performance (solid line) remarkably closely. This suggests that the linear-log speciﬁcation is suitable
o estimate the effect of tenure log(di,t) on performance yi,t. Our regression model can thus be written as
yi,t =  ˛ + log (di,t)′ˇ1 + X ′i,tˇ2 + t + ui,t (3)
here  ˛ is the constant, Xi,t contains various individual-speciﬁc characteristics (e.g., working hours), team ﬁxed effects, and
eek ﬁxed effects  t to control for time trends and ﬂuctuations.4 The idiosyncratic error term ui,t is clustered to allow for
ithin-agent correlation.
4 Average performance ﬂuctuates substantially around its mean due to issues such as technical network problems, problems with the internal IT system,
nd  changes in the composition of call types. Time ﬁxed effects  t are introduced to control for these shocks.
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Table 2
The effect of tenure on the performance of new hires.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(tenure) 0.0475*** 0.0455*** 0.0402*** 0.0381*** 0.0393*** 0.0358*** 0.0445*** 0.0443*** 0.0437***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0033)
Working hours −0.0004 0.0001 −0.0004 0.0000 −0.0008*** −0.0003 −0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Training hours (cumulated) 0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0006** 0.0007** −0.0001 0.0002*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Gender (1 = male) −0.0017 −0.0009 −0.0010 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0092)
Age −0.0009 −0.0011 −0.0011 −0.0012* −0.0012*
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Constant 0.3743*** 0.3973*** 0.3962*** 0.3698*** 0.3978*** 0.3231*** 0.3905*** 0.3923*** 0.4102***
(0.0074) (0.0205) (0.0252) (0.0336) (0.0293) (0.0406) (0.0077) (0.0326) (0.0323)
R2 0.206 0.195 0.208 0.289 0.233 0.311 0.230 0.359 0.371
Observations 6295 5907 5551 5551 5551 5551 5551 5551 6295
Number of agents 284 263 228 228 228 228 228 228 284
Individual ﬁxed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Week  ﬁxed effects No No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Team  ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yi,t . All regressions are estimated using all new hires. Standard errors are clustered at the agent
level.
Our parameter of interest is ˇ1. The estimated parameter determines the slope of the tenure-performance proﬁle, which
indicates the learning process of new hires. Because agents start at different points in time, the effect of tenure can be
identiﬁed from time effects.5
Table 2 shows the results of estimating different speciﬁcations of Eq. (3) with varying control variables and varying sets
of ﬁxed effects. Across these speciﬁcations, we estimate ̂ˇ1 between 0.0358 and 0.0475. This means that a 10% increase in
tenure is related to an increase in an agent’s performance yi,t of roughly 0.004. Given a standard deviation of 0.1037, this
translates into an increase of about 4% of one standard deviation of performance yi,t.
To control for agents’ characteristics, we include weekly working hours, the number of training hours, and the agents’
gender and age. The inclusion of working hours and the number of hours of in-house training programs cumulated over the
agent’s tenure slightly reduces the estimated tenure coefﬁcient to 0.0402 (Column (3) in Table 2).6 As the tenure coefﬁcient
(̂ˇ1) is expected to include the results of both on-the-job learning and formal training, the estimated effect of tenure is
indeed lower when controlling for formal training courses.
In Column (4), we include week ﬁxed effects to control for week-speciﬁc changes in performance, while in Column
(5) team ﬁxed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity between teams such as team leader-speciﬁc effects. The esti-
mation results reported in Column (6) show the estimates with both team and week ﬁxed effects. Neither substantially
alters the estimated effect of tenure on performance. As a last step, we include individual ﬁxed effects (Columns (7)–(9)).
Worker ﬁxed effects are included to control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics that affect both worker tenure
and performance (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987). Contrary to the usual ﬁnding of a lower tenure coefﬁcient with indi-
vidual ﬁxed effects, the estimates in Columns (7)–(9) are larger than for the same regressions without individual ﬁxed
effects. A plausible explanation for this result is that we  only observe a very steep performance increase in the ﬁrst
months of employment for leavers, whereas we observe declining performance growth in later months of employment
only for those who stay. We  ﬁnd that if we limit the sample to the ﬁrst three or six months of tenure, the estimates
behave as expected: The inclusion of individual ﬁxed effects leads to a signiﬁcantly lower coefﬁcient for log(tenure).
This is opposite to the estimates presented in Table 2 and is likely due to the fact that we  do not observe the ﬂatten-
ing of the tenure-performance proﬁle for agents leaving the call center.7 For the remainder of this paper, we use the
speciﬁcation presented in Column (6) of Table 2 as this is the most conservative estimate of the tenure-performance
proﬁle.
We interpret the tenure-performance proﬁle as learning in the workplace. Repetition of the same task, that is, answering
customer calls, leads to rapid performance improvements in the ﬁrst months of employment, with decreasing returns to
tenure. Panel (b) of Fig. 1 shows the growth rate of performance for each week of tenure. Growth rates seem to converge to
a low level after only a few weeks of tenure. This suggests that the initial learning potential is large, whereas performance
improvement thereafter is rather small. Yet, there might be two  alternative explanations. First, the tenure-performance
proﬁle might be the result of incentives. The steep increase in performance during the ﬁrst months of employment is,
5 Models using linear, quadratic, and cubic speciﬁcations of tenure yield stable results irrespective of the inclusion of weekly or individual worker ﬁxed
effects.
6 Examples of formal in-house training are instructions for promotions or training courses on how to handle customers more efﬁciently.
7 We do not report these results in the interest of brevity, but they are available upon request.
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Iig. 2. Tenure-performance proﬁles for stayers and leavers. Note: This ﬁgure shows the tenure-performance proﬁles for agents staying 12 months or longer
solid  line), agents who  are staying for at least 3 months but are leaving within the ﬁrst 12 months (long dashed line), agents staying for at least 3 months
short dashed line), and agents leaving within the ﬁrst three months (dashed-dotted line).
owever, not reﬂected by an increase in worker pay. Since workers’ wages are adjusted only once each year, there are no
xplicit incentives that can explain this steep tenure-performance proﬁle.
The second alternative interpretation for our ﬁndings is that the selection of agents might be linked to unobserved factors
uch as motivation or ability. Indeed, call centers face a relatively high worker turnover compared to other industry sectors
Batt et al., 2006). A total of 66% of all newly hired agents (186 agents) observed in our data leave the department within the
rst year. A large share of these agents (76%) leave the department within six months (“leavers”). If the probability to quit
s related to individual performance or to unobserved factors that affect both the tenure and performance of an individual
orker (such as the worker’s ability), the shape of the estimated tenure-performance proﬁle is likely to be affected by workers
ho quit the ﬁrm. The observed increase in performance with tenure could thus be partly due to improved match quality
nstead of on-the-job learning. Columns (3)–(5) of Table 1 show that leavers have lower performance, work on average fewer
ours, are younger, and have higher completed education, compared to agents who  stay in the department throughout our
ata.8
To further investigate whether labor turnover is selective, we ﬁrst provide descriptive evidence in Fig. 2. The ﬁgure shows
he tenure-performance proﬁle for agents staying in the department throughout their ﬁrst year (solid line) and agents leaving
ithin the ﬁrst 12 months (dashed line). Though the tenure-performance proﬁles for 12 months-leavers seems to be slightly
ower than the one for 12 months-stayers, all proﬁles are remarkably close to each other. Individuals leaving shortly, i.e.
ithin three months, after entering the department provide similar performance as agents staying longer in the department.
hough one might argue that this might be a net effect of negative selection (out of the ﬁrm) and positive selection (to other
epartments in the ﬁrm), this ﬁgure suggests that selection effects are less relevant.
This result is also conﬁrmed by the results in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimated tenure-performance
roﬁles for agents who stay for at least three months (Column (1)), while Column (2) shows the results for agents who  drop
ut during this period. The results show that the stayers have a signiﬁcantly higher tenure-performance proﬁle compared
o the leavers. However, when looking at agents who survived at least three months (Columns (3) and (4)), we  observe no
igniﬁcant difference in the estimated tenure-performance proﬁles for the two  groups. This suggests that selection only
ccurs in the ﬁrst few months of working for the call center.
Previous studies also report quite large estimates of on-the-job learning in other occupations, with strong learning effects
n the early period of job tenure that then ﬂattens, most likely depending on the complexity of the tasks. Carroll et al. (1986)
nd a roughly 350% performance increase in the ﬁrst year for Navy recruiters. In their study, the size of this effect is, however,
riven by a very low productivity in the ﬁrst month. For several jobs, Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) report similar strong
earning that is comparable to the results of our study. Shaw and Lazear (2008) report that windshield installers improve
erformance in the ﬁrst six (12) months by 53% (82%). The main reason for differences in estimated tenure-performance
roﬁles across studies is probably the potential to learn on the job, as well as the availability of alternative learning routes,
uch as vocational education and vocational training, which vary between industry sectors and occupational groups.9 If
8 Agents leaving the call center department are deﬁned as agents who  disappear from the personnel data for at least 20 consecutive weeks and do not
eappear. These drop-outs may  be internal, that is, leaving for similar or other jobs in other departments, or external, that is, leaving the ﬁrm entirely.
9 Another reason for differences in performance increases during the ﬁrst period of employment in different studies is likely to be the deﬁnition of tenure.
n  our study, tenure is deﬁned in calendar weeks, starting with week 1 as the ﬁrst working week after the initial training at the ﬁrm. Using data that are
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Table 3
Estimating tenure-performance proﬁles for stayers and leavers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stayer Leaver Stayer Leaver
3  months 3 months 12 months 12 months
log(tenure) 0.0457*** 0.0321*** 0.0311*** 0.0316***
(0.0059) (0.0047) (0.0065) (0.0044)
Constant 0.4834*** 0.5044*** 0.1998*** 0.3069***
(0.0572) (0.0341) (0.0509) (0.0440)
R2 0.388 0.484 0.332 0.372
Observations 1135 1408 2970 2210
Number of agents 95 133 95 83Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yi,t . All regressions are estimated using all new hires. Standard errors are clustered at the agent
level.  Columns (1) and (2) include observations from the ﬁrst 3 months of tenure; Columns (3) and (4) include observations from the ﬁrst 12 months of
tenure.  All regressions include week ﬁxed effects, team ﬁxed effects, and control variables (working hours, cumulated training hours, gender, and age).
vocational learning and learning on the job are substitutes, prior investments in training will be negatively related to the
amount of on-the-job learning.
3.3. Estimating peer effects in learning
The steep tenure-performance proﬁle for newly hired agents raises the question to what extent they learn from peers
in their team j. Our main variable to capture peer effects, denoted dj,(i),t , is based on the measure of peer tenure, which is
deﬁned as the average tenure of an agent i’s peer in the same team j in the week t, excluding the agent i’s own contribution10:
dj,(i),t =
∑Kj,t
k = 1dk,t − di,t
Kj,t − 1
(4)
where Kj,t is the total number of agents in an agent’s team j in week t. Because not every agent is working in each week,
team size Kj,t can vary from week to week. For providing evidence on peer effects, we  calculate this variable for average
tenure of current peers, average tenure of last week’s peers, and the average of peer tenure during the last 4 weeks. In either
deﬁnition, agent i’s own contribution to the team j’s mean is excluded from the calculation of average peer tenure (Angrist,
2014).
Fig. 3 shows the tenure-performance proﬁle for agents with peer tenure below (solid line) and above (dashed line) the
median peer tenure (dj,(i),t). The ﬁgure shows that agents who are employed in relatively experienced teams appear to have
slightly higher tenure-performance proﬁles and thus experience faster learning.
As a test of peer effects in learning, we augment Eq. (3) by a linear variable measuring average peer tenure in the team
in which they are employed (dj,(i),t):
yi,t =  ˛ + log (di,t)′ˇ1 + X ′i,tˇ2 + dj,(i),tˇ3 + t + ui,t (5)
Columns (1)–(3) of Table 4 shows estimation results of the effect of current, last week’s, and last month’s average peer
tenure, on the main measure of performance, yi,t. These results indicate that average tenure of peers does not signiﬁcantly
affect new hires’ performance. The point estimates of peer tenure in all regressions are in the same range (0.0033–0.0044),
yet all not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Although peer effects are often deﬁned as averages across groups, the linear peer tenure variable assuming constant
effects throughout the ﬁrst year of employment might not be a good approximation to estimate learning effects as the
previous subsection provided evidence that learning of agents is particularly steep in the very early months, but decreasing
thereafter. Therefore, we estimate tenure-performance proﬁles (Eq. (3)) separately for agents who  are exposed to peers
with above-median tenure, and for agents who are exposed to below-median tenure, respectively. This does not only relax
the assumption of a linear effect of average peer tenure, but also allows for differences of the curvature of the tenure-
performance proﬁle between agents placed in low-tenure and high-tenure teams. This model is estimated for the ﬁrst 3, 6,
9, and 12 months of tenure, respectively.
The results, shown in Table 5, provide evidence for differences in tenure-performance proﬁles between agents placed
in teams with low-tenure peers, and agents placed in teams high-tenure teams. Whereas the point estimate for tenure-
performance proﬁles in high-tenure teams is larger for all periods, the estimates are only signiﬁcantly different during
new hires’ ﬁrst three months of tenure (Columns (1) and (2)). During this period, agents placed in teams with peers with
aggregated, for example, at the month level yields different estimates. Estimates of tenure-performance proﬁles will therefore not be perfectly comparable
across studies.
10 By measuring peer effects by average peer tenure instead of average performance, we  avoid the problem of spurious correlation, which can appear if
both  the left-hand side variable and the peer variable are based on the same variable (Angrist, 2014).
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Fig. 3. Tenure-performance proﬁles for new hires in teams with tenure above and below the median, respectively. Note: The solid line shows the mean of
yi,t by tenure for agents in teams with tenure below the median. The capped spikes show the appropriate 95% conﬁdence intervals. The dashed line shows
the  same ﬁgure for agents in teams with tenure above the median. The underlying measure of performance is detrended by including week ﬁxed effects.
Table 4
Deﬁnitions of average team tenure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Performance (yi,t) Call quality (y
q
i,t
)
log(tenure) 0.0344*** 0.0345*** 0.0345*** −0.0101** −0.0083 −0.0085
(0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0061)
Average team tenure (current) 0.0044 −0.0023
(0.0032) (0.0032)
Average team tenure (last week) 0.0034 −0.0040
(0.0033) (0.0033)
Average team tenure (last month) 0.0033 −0.0035
(0.0037) (0.0037)
Constant 0.3028*** 0.3228*** 0.4052*** 0.7822*** 0.5906*** 0.7212***
(0.0403) (0.0463) (0.0494) (0.1024) (0.0480) (0.0571)
R2 0.313 0.283 0.279 0.335 0.335 0.335
Observations 5551 5323 5280 4069 3927 3887
Number of agents 228 228 228 196 194 194
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yi,t (Columns (1)–(3)); y
q
i,t
(Columns (4)–(6)). All regressions are estimated using all new hires.
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everage peer tenure is deﬁned as the average tenure of an agent’s peers. Standard errors are clustered at the agent level. All regressions include week ﬁxed
ffects, team ﬁxed effects, and control variables (working hours, cumulated training hours, gender, and age).
igher tenure have experienced a steeper tenure-performance proﬁle than agents working in teams with lower peer tenure,
uggesting that they beneﬁt from peers with higher tenure, e.g. due to learning.11
To shed more light on the question from which peers newly hired agents might learn, we  estimate the effect of log(tenure)
n performance by the difference between an agent’s own tenure and peer tenure, while controlling for the agent’s own
enure. The dashed (horizontal) line in Fig. 4 shows our baseline estimate of the tenure-performance proﬁle (cf. Column
6) of Table 2). The solid line shows the point estimates of tenure-performance proﬁles by the distance between an agent’s
enure and average team tenure. The ﬁgure shows that agents who are in teams with similar tenure as their peers have a
enure-performance proﬁle estimate that is slightly lower than the benchmark. In addition, the point estimate of the tenure-
erformance proﬁle is higher than the benchmark estimate if peer tenure is at least 11 months greater than own tenure; i.e.
he solid line crosses the dashed line at about 11 months. Though most point estimates are not signiﬁcantly different from
he baseline estimate, this result suggests that performance can already increase when working with only slightly more
xperienced peers.
11 This is tested based on a t-test for equality of the estimated log(tenure)-coefﬁcients in both regressions.
48 A. De Grip et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 126 (2016) 39–54
Table 5
The effect of peers’ tenure on own performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tenure ≤ 3 months ≤ 6 months ≤ 9 months ≤ 12 months
Peer tenure Low High Low High Low High Low High
log(tenure) 0.0269*** 0.0450*** 0.0315*** 0.0381*** 0.0317*** 0.0329*** 0.0325*** 0.0379***
(0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0051)
Team  turnover 0.1079 −0.0564 −0.0090 −0.1928** 0.0196 −0.1753** −0.0535 −0.1295
(0.1303) (0.0599) (0.0785) (0.0775) (0.0818) (0.0824) (0.0813) (0.0953)
Constant 0.3245*** 0.6015*** 0.3791*** 0.4625*** 0.3427*** 0.3128*** 0.3551*** 0.3741***
(0.0332) (0.0878) (0.0492) (0.0540) (0.0446) (0.0639) (0.0325) (0.0813)
R2 0.390 0.432 0.337 0.349 0.313 0.335 0.316 0.304
Observations 1253 1175 2318 2222 2864 2810 3310 3316
Number of agents 179 173 208 197 217 179 238 190
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yi,t . All regressions are estimated using all new hires. The sample is restricted to agents with
a  maximum tenure 3, 6, 9, and 12 months, respectively. Low (high) peer tenure is deﬁned as peer tenure below (above) the median peer tenure in the
estimation sample analyzed. Team turnover is deﬁned at the team level and is calculated as the average number of agents leaving a team divided by the
number  of agents working in a team. Standard errors are clustered at the agent level. All regressions include week ﬁxed effects, team ﬁxed effects, and
control variables (working hours, cumulated training hours, gender, and age).
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
Es
tim
at
ed
 c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
 lo
g(t
en
ure
)
−1 0 1 2 3
Difference peer to own tenure (in years)
Fig. 4. Tenure-performance estimates related to differences between a worker’s peers’ and their own  tenure. Note: The solid line show the estimated
tenure-performance proﬁles (beta1 from Eq. (3)) separately for observations with the given difference (in years) from workers’ own tenure to average peer
tenure. The capped spikes indicate the appropriate 95% conﬁdence intervals. The long-dashed horizontal line shows the average.
A potential concern about the estimation of peer tenure on the tenure-performance proﬁle is the potential self-selection
of agents with speciﬁc unobservable characteristics into teams. In this study, we use variation in peer composition to identify
the estimation of peer effects. To credibly argue that the variation of newly hired agents to teams is random, two  conditions
need to be met. First, starting agents need to be randomly assigned to the existing teams. Second, there should be no selection
of workers to particular working hours or shifts. If one of these assignments is not random, for example, due to the team
leader’s involvement, the estimated peer effect will be biased upward.
We argue that in our analysis potential biases due to any remaining selection into teams can be neglected because team
leaders are not involved in the selection of newly hired agents into teams. Newly hired agents are assigned by general
management to teams with vacancies. In addition, it is difﬁcult for agents to select themselves into the same hours as
particular peers. Agents must be available for scheduling during the opening hours of the call center and must state their
preferences for particular hours four weeks prior. Based on both agents’ preferences and expected customer demand, general
management assigns agents to particular shifts without taking the team assignment into consideration. As a result, both the
composition of agents at each point in time and weekly team composition change frequently. Since scheduling is done for
the entire department and not for individual teams, there is no room for strategic planning within teams. Therefore, there
is no reason to expect that spurious correlation drives our estimation of peer effects.
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Table  6
Selection of new agents to peers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age Education Previous experience Gender
Average peer age −0.1193 −0.1326
(0.1468) (0.1906)
Average peer education −0.5684 −0.5624
(0.5018) (0.5020)
Average peer prior experience −3.6501 −2.1165
(2.6312) (3.8346)
Average peer gender −1.1431 −1.1725
(1.2243) (1.2125)
Average peer tenure 0.0724 −0.0416 1.1471*** 0.0588
(0.6894) (0.1120) (0.3698) (0.0969)
Constant 27.0034*** 27.2173*** 2.8842*** 2.7826** 1.5131 −0.4780 −0.5800** −0.6849**
(4.4236) (4.7982) (0.7806) (1.2227) (1.1014) (1.7690) (0.2795) (0.3151)
R2 0.078 0.078 0.299 0.302
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.290 0.074 0.074
Observations 254 254 60 60 46 46 274 274
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table shows the results of a regression of average characteristics (age, completed education, gender) of new hires’
peers on new hires’ characteristics. Information on age and gender is taken from the ﬁrm’s personnel records, information on completed education is taken
from  a employee survey conducted in March to May  2009. Completed education is measured as low, medium, and high education. Previous experience is
a  dummy which is 1 if an agent stated to have worked in a call center prior to his current job. Columns (1)–(4) are estimated using ordinary least squares,
C
t
o
e
e
v
h
f
S
o
o
p
c
b
s
w
e
5
t
p
3
p
p
i
i
i
p
e
polumns (5)–(8) are estimated using probit estimation. All standard errors are clustered at the team level. All regressions include team ﬁxed effects.
To provide additional evidence against the argument that peers are endogenously selected to each other, we  provide
hree tests. First, one concern of the peer tenure estimates in Column (1) of Table 5 and the difference in the tenure estimate
f Columns (2) and (3) is potential non-random selection into teams. All regressions so far control for team-speciﬁc ﬁxed
ffects which should eliminate any unobserved heterogeneity that is constant in teams. We  explore endogeneity of our
stimation results by augmenting Eq. (5) by a measure of team turnover. Higher turnover, which should result in more
acancies in a team, might be related with particularly low performance of agents. Although high-tenure teams seem to
ave smaller point estimates of the variable team turnover than low-tenure teams, this effect is only signiﬁcantly different
rom zero in two regressions (Columns (4) and (6)).
Second, Table 6 provides further evidence against non-random selection based on observable characteristics. Following
acerdote (2001), we estimate the effect of average peer characteristics on various characteristics of new hires: age, level
f education, previous experience in call centers, and gender. The table shows the regression coefﬁcients of a regression
f a new hire’s characteristics on the average peer characteristics at the time an agent starts in the team. Neither average
eer characteristics nor peer tenure are signiﬁcantly related to new hires’ observable characteristics. Only the estimated
oefﬁcient for average peer tenure on previous experience of new hires is signiﬁcantly different from zero. This suggests that,
ased on these observable characteristics, there is no evidence for selection of similar individuals into teams, and almost no
election with respect to a team’s tenure level.
Third, we use a placebo test in which we assigned agents to randomly chosen peers with similar team size. This procedure
as repeated 1000 times. Fig. 5 shows the histogram of 1000 estimated coefﬁcients for the variable peer tenure (̂ˇ3). The
stimates are centered around zero and are signiﬁcantly different from zero in 7.4% out of 1000 cases. Furthermore, only
.7% of the estimates are larger than the estimate of 0.0044 in Column (1) in Table 4. This provides further evidence against
he criticism that peer estimates are the results of spurious correlation and suggests that our estimates of peer tenure are
recisely estimated.
.4. Investments in on-the-job learning
Our interpretation of the shape of the tenure-performance proﬁle is that it reﬂects an agent’s stock of skills. The tenure-
erformance proﬁle can thus be used to estimate the size of the ﬁrm’s investment in on-the-job learning, G. For a vacant
osition, the ﬁrm can either appoint an experienced agent or hire an inexperienced agent with zero tenure. The ﬁrm invests
n on-the-job learning of new hires because it accepts low performance in the ﬁrst months, compared to a situation where
t would employ a fully experienced agent. We  therefore assume that an inexperienced agent starts with performance yd = 1
n the ﬁrst working week d = 1 and then exhibits the tenure-performance proﬁle estimated by Eq. (3) until the agent can
erform at the level of an experienced agent after D weeks of tenure, yd = D.To calculate the ﬁrm’s investments in newly hired workers before they achieve the same level of performance as more
xperienced agents, we use the original measure of average handling time ahtd. After calculating the difference between the
erformance of experienced agents and agents who  are not yet experienced, ahtd = D − ahtd ∀  d = 1, . . .,  D − 1, we  can multiply
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this difference in average handling time by the average number of calls an experienced agent handles in one week, cd. We
interpret the sum G
G =
D−1∑
d = 1
(ahtd = D − ahtd) · cd (6)
as the human capital investment in untrained workers during their ﬁrst year. Since the wage proﬁle is relatively ﬂat for
workers in their ﬁrst year, the ﬁrm implicitly needs to invest G number of hours of on-the-job learning when hiring a new
worker, as opposed to the alternative of having a worker with at least one year of tenure for the same task. When using the
non-parametric estimate of the tenure-performance proﬁle (cf. Fig. 1), we ﬁnd that 127 h of on-the-job learning are required
before a new hire has the same productivity as an experienced agent.
This calculation also allows us to point out the value of peer tenure for a new hire. When calculating G for agents in
experienced and inexperienced teams (cf. Fig. 3), we ﬁnd considerable differences: Agents in less experienced teams need
160 h of investments in on-the-job learning, while agents in more experienced teams need only 102 h. This suggests that by
placing new workers in experienced teams reduces the investments in on-the-job learning by 36%. The difference between
agents placed in experienced teams and those who  are placed in inexperienced teams seems relatively large, given the
modest effect of peer tenure on learning. The numbers, however, are calculated cumulatively over the ﬁrst year of tenure.
Over the course of the ﬁrst year, workers work an average of 1090 h.
Data on formal training programs provided by the ﬁrm show that new hires spend on average of 124 h on formal training
programs paid by the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst year of their employment, most of which is starter training before the ﬁrst working
week. This shows that the ﬁrm’s investment in on-the-job learning for new hires (127 h) is similar to the investments in
formal training.
4. Robustness checks and additional results
4.1. Working hours and the shape of tenure-performance proﬁles
There is substantial within- and between-worker heterogeneity in the working hours at the call center we  analyze. If
on-the-job learning is related to the actual number of hours worked, this heterogeneity may lead to differences in the shape
of the estimated tenure-performance proﬁles, depending on the number of working hours. Since we  measure tenure in
calendar weeks, part-timers build up less tenure in a week than those who work full-time and will therefore have lower
tenure-performance proﬁles.To assess this possible heterogeneity, we re-estimate the tenure-performance proﬁles for two  different groups of work-
ers, part-time workers and full-time workers. Table 7 shows that part-timers have signiﬁcantly lower tenure-performance
proﬁles compared to those of full-time agents. Though the differences in the estimated tenure-performance proﬁles might
also be the result of selection of certain types of individuals into part-time and full-time jobs, this result suggests that the
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Table  7
Tenure-performance proﬁles for part-time and full-time workers.
(1) (2)
Part-time Full-time
log(tenure) log(tenure)
log(tenure) 0.0289*** 0.0412***
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.4176*** 0.3734***
(0.045) (0.035)
R2 0.347 0.380
Observations 2794 2757
Number of agents 112 116
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yi,t . All standard errors are clustered at the agent
level.  All regressions are estimated using all new hires. Part-time and full-time are deﬁned as, respectively,
below- and above-the median number of working hours over the ﬁrst year of employment. All regressions
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sinclude week ﬁxed effects, team ﬁxed effects, and control variables (working hours, cumulated training hours,
gender, and age).
umber of working hours determines the tenure-performance proﬁles, especially for jobs dominated by part-time workers.
he result also strongly suggests that performance does increase over time due to the accumulation of human capital by
earning on the job.
.2. Trade-off between the quantity and quality of calls
The performance variable used in this study, average handling time, is a measure of quantitative performance. How-
ver, there may  be a trade-off between the quantity and quality of calls, as shorter calls may  not always be satisfactory
or customers, e.g. because problems are not entirely solved. Following De Grip and Sauermann (2012), we therefore use
dditional information to estimate the effect of tenure on the quality of calls. First, we use a measure that is based on the
hare of repeat calls to capture the quality of agents’ calls. The share of repeat calls is deﬁned as the share of customers
o whom an agent spoke who call back within seven days. This measure is used by management to evaluate the quality of
alls, since customers will call again if their problem is not solved. Low values of repeat calls (rci,t) are interpreted as high
erformance. We  therefore deﬁne call quality as yq
i,t
= (1/rci,t ∗ 10). The average quality is 0.527 for new hires in their ﬁrst
ear of employment (see Table 1). Given that this variable is available for each agent for each working week, the data allow
s to create a composite measure of productivity that contains both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of worker
erformance. We  deﬁne this composite measure as y′
i,t
as y′
i,t
= yi,t ∗ (1 − rci,t). The intuition of this measure is that larger
hares of repeat calls rci,t are interpreted as a performance penalty, since each additional percentage point in the share of
epeat calls (lower quality) relates to a lower composite measure of productivity y′
i,t
.
Second, we use information from a customer satisfaction survey as an alternative measure of call quality. This survey is
onducted monthly to monitor the quality provided by the departments at an aggregate level but can be linked to individual
gents. Each month, 200 incoming calls are randomly selected and the customers are called for a short survey. The survey
ontains three outcomes related to agent quality. Customers were asked to grade the “knowledge of the agent” (Grade 1),
hether the “agent understood the question” (Grade 2), and whether the agent had a “solution to the problem” (Grade 3)
n a scale from one (very bad) to 10 (very good). Despite the fact that the sample size for the customer satisfaction variables
s rather small, the results of this survey provide additional evidence on call quality.
Panels (a)–(c) of Fig. 6 show the tenure-performance proﬁle for the call quality measure (yq
i,t
), the composite measure
y′
i,t
), and the customer satisfaction measure, respectively. Panel (a) of Fig. 6 shows that call quality appears to decrease
n the ﬁrst three months of employment and ﬂattens thereafter. However, compared to our main performance measure,
he decrease in quality over time seems to be small. For the composite measure (Panel (b)), the increase in performance
herefore remains strong and signiﬁcant. Panel (c) shows that little variation in customer satisfaction is explained by agent
enure.
Table 8 shows the estimation results of the relation between tenure and call quality outcome. Column (1) shows that
ith increasing tenure, call quality signiﬁcantly decreases (−0.011). A 10% increase in tenure is thus related to a decrease in
all quality by 0.5% of one standard deviation in the quality measure. This suggests that, despite the fact that performance
uantity improves substantially over the course of the ﬁrst months, this result comes partly at the cost of slightly lower
all quality. However, the results in Column (2) of Table 8 indicate a positive effect of tenure on the overall composite
erformance measure. The estimated coefﬁcient of 0.024 is signiﬁcantly different from zero. A 10% increase in tenure thus
eads to an increase in overall performance of 3.1% of a standard deviation. This suggests that the positive performance
uantity effect outweighs the negative quality effect.
Using the more speciﬁc information on call quality from the customer satisfaction survey, Columns (3)–(5) of Table 8
how no signiﬁcant relation between agent tenure and the three speciﬁc aspects of customer satisfaction. Neither the agent’s
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Fig. 6. Non-parametric tenure-quality proﬁles and composite performance proﬁles for new hires. Note: Panel (a) shows the tenure-performance proﬁle for
the  repeat call measure and Panel (b) shows the corresponding ﬁgure for the composite performance measure. The capped spikes show the appropriate
95%  conﬁdence intervals. The dashed line shows the predicted performance after regression of yi,t on log(tenure). Panel (c) shows the corresponding
tenure-performance proﬁles for grades taken from the customer satisfaction survey. Grades are deﬁned for “knowledge of agent” (Grade 1, solid line),
“agent  understood question” (Grade 2, dashed line), and “agent’s solution of the problem” (Grade 3, dotted line). All grades are deﬁned on a scale of one to
10.
Table 8
Estimating new hires’ tenure-performance proﬁles for call quality outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Repeat calls Composite measure Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
log(tenure) −0.0109** 0.0240*** 0.1188 0.1146 −0.1139
(0.005) (0.003) (0.252) (0.230) (0.270)
Number of surveys −0.0895 −0.1074 −0.0409
(0.084) (0.081) (0.106)
Constant 0.7664*** 0.3036*** 7.4923*** 6.7503*** 6.6909***
(0.098) (0.028) (0.572) (1.466) (0.995)
R2 0.334 0.242 0.135 0.243 0.184
Observations 4069 4069 321 321 301
Number of agents 196 196 86 86 83
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions are estimated using all new hires. Standard errors are clustered at the agent level. Grades are deﬁned
for  “knowledge of agent” (Grade 1), “agent understood question” (Grade 2), and “agent’s solution of the problem” (Grade 3). All grades are deﬁned on a
scale  of one to 10. All regressions include week ﬁxed effects, team ﬁxed effects, and control variables (working hours, cumulated training hours, gender,
and  age). The number of surveys is deﬁned as the number of customer surveys which the grades are based on.
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nowledge, the agent’s understanding of the question, nor having a proper solution to the customer’s problem appear to be
elated to the tenure of new hires.
To analyze whether peer tenure affects service quality, we  repeat the analysis shown in Section 3.3 with the quality
utcome yq
i,t
. The results shown in Table 4 show a similar pattern as with yi,t: the average peer tenure in the current and the
revious week, and the previous month result in similar estimates, which are all not signiﬁcant. In line with the estimate
f new hires’ own tenure on yq
i,t
, all estimated coefﬁcients are negative. Different to the estimates for yi,t, own  tenure is
ot signiﬁcantly different from zero when including lagged measures of average team tenure in the regressions on quality
utcome (Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4).
. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the tenure-performance proﬁles of newly hired call center agents, using unique weekly panel
ata from a multinational telecommunication ﬁrm’s call center that contain detailed performance information at the indi-
idual level. Our results show that call agents have a very steep tenure-performance proﬁle in the beginning of their job in
he call center. This increase, however, diminishes considerably after about six months. The tenure-performance proﬁle can
ery well be described by a logarithmic function. An increase in tenure of 10% leads to an increase of 4% of one standard
eviation in performance. Although we ﬁnd that agents leaving the call center are rather low-performers, our results are
ot driven by this selection.
We  interpret the increase in performance during the ﬁrst year of employment as learning due to the accumulation
f human capital. Since the agents’ task—answering customer calls—is repetitive, the highest returns to learning could be
xpected to occur in the beginning of the employment relationship. In our sample, agents perform 64% better after 12 months,
hich is comparable to related ﬁndings from other industry sectors. This learning effect is very strong in the beginning, and
attens off after about 6 months. The rather fast learning of agents may  be due to the relatively low complexity of their job.
n other, more complex jobs, tenure-performance proﬁles are likely be less steep.
Our results show that the ﬁrm’s investment in on-the-job learning is substantial. The lower performance of agents
efore they reach the performance level of more experienced agents translates into an investment in on-the-job learning
f about 127 working hours. This amount of time spent on learning on the job comes close to the ﬁrm’s investments in
ormal training courses for new hires, which accumulate to an average of 124 working hours. However, when using data on
ustomer satisfaction, we ﬁnd evidence of a quality–quantity trade-off in the tenure-performance proﬁle. As new hires gain
enure, the number of customers calling back within a few days after the call increases slightly, which suggests a decrease in
he quality delivered to the customer. Overall, the increase in quantitative performance outweighs the decrease in quality.
Furthermore, our study is the ﬁrst that shows that new hires beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from working with more experienced
eers, especially during the ﬁrst 3 months. We  ﬁnd that this effect is stronger when peers are more experienced. Agents
n less experienced teams need 160 h of investments in on-the-job learning, while agents in more experienced teams need
nly 102 h. This suggests that placing new agents in experienced teams reduces the investments in on-the-job learning by
6%.
The speed of this learning process is most important for call centers and other ﬁrms which often recruit new hires because
f high quit rates, but deﬁnitely it is highly relevant for all ﬁrms that employ new hires. Initial productivity of new hires is
ften quite low compared to that of more experienced workers as shown by various studies (Carroll et al., 1986; Kostiuk
nd Follmann, 1989; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995; Shaw and Lazear, 2008) Our ﬁndings on the impact of team composition
n the speed of learning of new hires shows that ﬁrm productivity could improve when new hires are placed in teams with
ore experienced agents instead of forming teams of predominantly newly hired workers. This particularly holds for the
rst 3 months of employment.
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